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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE X. ~-\NDERSON and 
wife, L\IOGENE T. ~-\NDERSON, 
LOREXZO \Y. ~-\XDERSON. here-
tofore known a:::; LORENZO W. 
AXDERSOX. JR., and wife HAZ-
EL :JI. AXDERSOX. 
plaintiffs and appellants, 
vs. 
j!ARIE T. JOHNSON and 
CHESTER X. JOHNSON, 
defendants and respondents 
APELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Lorenzo ,V. Anderson, now deceased, was a resident 
of Brigham City, Box Elder County and was engaged 
most of his life in Civil Engineering. On the side, he 
forn1erl~· did some abstracting and conveyancing. He 
was t lit> owner of the tracts of land described on page 
9 of the files. It appears from the evidence that it was 
his de~ire to divide his property in his lifetime mnong 
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2 
his children rather than subject the same to probate. 
Oeorge N. Anderson, Lorenzo W. Anderson, the plain-
tiffs and appellants, and Marie T. Johnson, defendant 
and respondent, are all of the surviving children of the 
senior Anderson. To distinguish between the deceased 
and his son, Lorenzo, I will refer herein to the surviv-
ing son as Ren and the senior Anderson, deceased, as 
• 'deceased' '. 
'l,he only property with which we are concerned in 
this appeal consists of Tract No. 2 which will be referred 
to as the Garland property and the tract described in 
paragraph 9 (c) (tr. 9) which I will refer to as the 
Promontory property. 
The deceased, in furtherance of his desire to divide 
his property before death, made two sets of deeds with 
which this appeal is concerned. In March of 1943, he 
caused to be drawn a warranty deed to Ren which pur-
ported to convey to Ren the Garland tract and a 1/3 
undivided interest in the Promontory tract. Having 
made sorne previous conveyances to his daughter, Marie, 
and his son, George, he then drew other deeds granting 
a undivided 1./3 interest in the Promontory property 
to each George and Marie. The question of the delivery 
of these 1943 deeds is the focal point of this case 
because in 1949 an additional set of deeds were drawn 
by the deceased in which all of the Promontory property 
was conveyed to his daughter, Marie and her husband. 
George Anderson was eliminated from any ownership 
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in the Pron10ntory trart as was also Ren and a IWW dtwd 
drawn in Ren'~ favor conveying to hhn the ~ame Oar-
land tract. 
rrhe E)-!3 deeds were never reeorded but all parties 
agreed in Court that they were Pxecutd as pleaded ( tr. 
182). The 1943 deeds were destroyed by Marie in 1949 
(tr. 126). None of the appellants knew or were ad-
vised of the so-called destruction of the 1943 deeds until 
they can1e to Utah for their father's funeral. Marie, 
however, claims to have had her 1949 deed delivered to 
her by the deceased and she recorded her deed the day 
before her Father died (tr. 127). Marie testified rather 
fully as to the delivery of the 1949 deeds but was pre-
vented from testifying as to the delivery of the 1943 
deeds (tr. 119). Marie and Chester Johnson were called 
to testify as adverse parties by the appellants (tr. 117). 
The plaintiffs were called to testify as grantees and all 
were excluded from testifying as to transactions with 
deceased upon objection made by the attorney for the 
respondents. ( tr. 183) 
The appellants offered to prove by Marie Johnson 
the fact of the execution and delivery of the 1943 deeds 
and this offer as well as other testimony relating to 
all parties was excluded by the Court under the provis-
ions of Section 104-49-2, (3), UCA, 1943, which will be 
referred to hereafter as the dead man's statute. (tr. 
104) It is felt that this statement will be agreed to 
by opposing counsel so that continued repetition of the 
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l'ads and citations from the transcrip are unnecessary. 
rl,he { ~ourt stated the substance of its rulings as appears 
on page 11 G of the transcript as follows: 
"As to the '43 deeds, apparenty we understand 
now there are two or three deeds made in 1943. The 
defendant, as an heir of Lorenzo Anderson, asserts 
this statute as to these '43 deeds and the Court is going 
to sustain the objection as to these conversations or 
any transaction which was equally within the knowledge 
of the witness, who is a party, and the deceased so the 
objection is sustained.'' 
George Anderson is a resident of the State of 
Idaho and Ren is a resident of the State of California 
and during the last few years of the deceased's life, 
he lived with Marie in Brigham City and the appellants 
claim that the only way that proof of execution and 
delivery of the 1943 deeds was by cross examination 
of the respondents and examination of the appellants 
as to transactions had with their father. The same 
objection was sustained as to Chester Johnson even 
though he is not an heir of the deceased (tr. 188). 
Similar rulings of the Court as to other witnesses appear 
on tr. 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 116, 117, and other places 
in the record so numerous as to make an unwarranted 
length of this statement of facts. The Court ruled 
that if an objection was raised by a grantee, the ob-
jection should be overruled but if it was raised by an 
heir, it should be sustained. (tr. 107) 
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The appellants 1naintain thn t the uwt hod t lu• dt>-
eeased used in nmking the deeds of 1!l-t-:~ and tho~w of 
1949 were the same and that therefore, it' thPrP wa~ a 
deliYery of the UJ4~) deeds. there also wa~ a delivery 
of the 1943 deeds, the earlier date being at a time when 
all parties agree that the deceased was in good n1ental 
and physical condition and that excluding transactions 
with the deceased pertaining to the 1943 deeds and 
to permit sin1ilar transactions with the deceased of 
the 19-19 deeds was prejudicial. ( tr. 321, beginning at 
line 2). Futhennore, between the dates of the two sets 
of deeds, the deceased had made a will sometime during 
th year of 19-17, (tr. 249) the terms of which wer.e en-
tirely inconsistent with the execution of the 1943 deeds 
as well as those of 1949. 
vVhile there are a great 1nany more facts of interest, 
it is thought that the foregoing is sufficient to inforn1 
the Court of the prejudicial error committed by the 
Court sufficient to grant a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
BY THE APPELLANTS 
That the Court erred in the following respects: 
FIRST: In its ruling that the provisions of Section 
104-49-2 sub-section 3, U CA 1943, commonly known as 
the "dead man's statute", applied to make incompetent 
to testify in this case either or any of the defendants and 
the plaintiffs. 
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SECOND: In sustaining defendants' objections as 
to any conversations that any of the plaintiffs claimed 
to have had with the deceased Lorenzo W. Anderson. 
THIRD: In its holding that one of the defendants, 
~~ arie 'l'. Johnson, called by the plaintiff on cross ex-
amination, was incompetent to testify as to any state-
ment by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter 
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within 
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased 
person, by reason of the provisions of said ''dead man's 
statute." 
FOURTH: In its holding that one of the defendants 
Chester N. Johnson, called by the plaintiff on cross ex-
amination, was incompetent to testify as to any state-
ment by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter 
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within 
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased 
person, by reason of the provisions of said "dead man's 
statute.'' 
FIFTH: In its holding that one of the plaintiffs, 
George N. Anderson, called by the plaintiff on direct 
examination, was incompetent to testify as to any state-
ment by, or transaction with, such deceased, or matter 
of fact whatever, which must have been equally within 
the knowledge of both the witness and such deceased 
person, by reason of the provisions of said ''dead man's 
statute.'' 
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SIXTH: In it holding that one of the plaintiffs, 
Lorenzo ,r. Anderson, Jr .. ealled by the plaintiff on 
direct exan1ination, "·a~ incompetent to testify as to 
any ~taten1ent by. or transaction with, such deceased, 
or matter of fact whatever, which 1nust have been equally 
within the kowledge of both the witness and such de-
ceased person, by reason of the provisions of the said 
"'dead 1nan 's statute." 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The so called ''dead an's statute'' does not 
apply to n1ake incompetent any of the parties to this 
cause because neither of the parties are sueing or de-
fending as heirs or administrators; neither are either 
of them defending as the assignee or grantee of any heir 
or devisee of the deceased. And furthrmore, the basis 
upon which the Court sustained counsel's objection has 
long since been abolished under our statutes by deleting 
the provision preventing a grantee of a deceased person 
to testify. The original "dead man's statute" simply 
prevented the testimony of a person as to transactions 
with a deceased person, ''where the matter of fact 
must have been equally within the knowledge of both the 
witnesses and the deceased.'' As stated by Justice Wolfe 
in Burnham vs. Eschler, 208 P. 2d 96. 
"The plaintiff's husband was entirely com-
petent to testify as to statements made by the 
plaintiff's deceased mother to the effect that 
certain bank deposits belong to the plaintiff.'' 
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It appears to me, at the outset that the de-
cision of this Court in Maxfield v. Sainr;bury, 172 
P. 2d 122 was written for the express purpose 
of guiding future litigation involving the dead 
man's statute. Chief Justice Larsen states: "It 
was never intended that this section should be 
used for the purpose of suppressing the truth. 
On the contrary, the statute's sole purpose is to 
prevent the proving by false testimony of claims 
against the estate of a deceased person.'' 
Again by Justice Wolfe : ''On the one side 
is a person who is seeking to protect the integ-
rity of the estate or to recover assets claimed 
to belong to it; on the other side is a person who 
seeks to subtract from the estate or resisting re-
covery of claimed assets. The statute is for the 
benefit of the first side and operates against the 
opposing party''. 
In the case at bar there is no estate. Both sides con-
tend that one of the two sets of deeds are valid. If both 
sets are void for one reason or another then we have the 
peculiar situation where both parties are trying to pro-
tect the estate by adding to the assets, and no assault 
is being made on the estate, and therefore, the statute 
cannot apply. 
The Utah case of Mower v. Mower, 228 P. 911 held 
that grantees in a deed who were also heirs of the de-
ceased did not disqualify them as witnesses as to the 
delivery of the deeds in· question. This cases is squarely 
in point. And this decision and holding was followed in 
Brown v. Skeen, 58 P. 2d 24. The Court said: (approving 
the Mower case) 
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'• The question aro:-;e n~ to whether or not 
eertain of the children of a deceased who were 
heir~ were di~qualified under the statute fron1 
testifying to having seen a deed in possession of 
their n1other. grantee of their father. In that 
case the court held that even though it were as-
sunled that the children had an interest in the 
event of the suit by reason of the fact that they 
were heirs of the deceased, that interest was with 
the plaintiff and not with the defendant, so that 
the adverse party, their mother, was not defend-
ing as administrator, heir, or legatee or devisee 
of the deceased, but was defending in her own 
right as grantee under the deed, so that the ex-
press terms of the statute did not exclude those 
children from being witnesses as to the posses-
sion of the deed''. 
The lower Court even prevented the husband of the 
defendant, J[arie T .• Johnson fron1 testfying as well 
as the wives of George and Ren Anderson. ( tr. 158~ 
159, 100, and 206) 
The following ruling of the Court is typical and 
shows clearly how the Court unduly restricted the proof 
of the plaintiff's case in the following words at page 
206 when the Court was speaking to an adverse wit-
ness, Marie T. Johnson. 
''I don't want you to tell the jury anything 
your father said concerning the 1943 deeds nor 
do I want you to tell the jury any transaction you 
had with your father." 
The whole record shows the manner in which the 
"dead u1an 'f' statute" was used to establish the de-
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livery of the '49 deeds which were favorable to the re-
spondents and to prevent the establishment of the '43 
deeds. 
This is clearly brought out in the testimony of Marie 
Johnson (tr. 320, 321) where she says "The 1949 deed 
he gave us'' and on page 321, she states ''In 1949 he 
gave us the deed and told us to keep it." 
These deeds, of course, are the ones that the re-
spondents were trying to establish and naturally there 
would have been no objection from their counsel. 
Justice Wade, in the concurring opinion in the 
Burnham case (Supra) said in speaking of the testimony 
of the husband: 
"Under those circumstances, the temptation 
not to tell the truth is often beyond the capacity 
of some people to resist.'' 
We have the reverse in this case where we call the 
adverse party and the only possible objection that could 
be made to their testimony whether they were competent 
or not was made in order to exclude the truth from the 
record. That is the reason why our statute provides an 
exception when called by the adverse party. 
In Staats vs. Staats, 226 P. 677 the Utah Court said: 
said: 
''This is not an assault upon the estate of the 
deceased, but is purely a controversy between the. 
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children who, a~ a matter of course, are heirs 
of the deceased and in this instance also his de-
visees, and the defendant who is the widow of 
the deceased and who refuses to abide by the 
provisions n1ade for her in her husband's will." 
That case discussed the 1natter of whether the widow 
who renounced the will wa~ talking as an heir or in 
her own right and the Court said: 
'·Indeed that can be the only basis of her 
claim since she refused to take under her hus-
band's will but elected to insist upon her statu-
tary interest of 1/3. In view, therefore, that 
she claimed her share of the estate in her own 
right, the other heirs are competent witnesses." 
That statute has no application where the contro-
versy arises between or among heirs and merely involves 
questions relating to their respective rights as such and 
where there is no assault upon the estate. 
In our case, there is certainly no assault upon the 
estate as no estate exists. It is merely a controversy be-
tween the parties as grantees to deeds. 
If all of the deeds had been held void for one 
reason or another, it would be creating an estate rather 
than making an assault upon an estate so that we con-
tend that all of the witnesses are competent to testify. 
Points 2, 5 and 6. These points are treated to-
gether because they involve the plaintiffs. In Miller 
vs. Livingston, by the Utah Supreme Court in 88 P. 
338 Mr. Justice Straup stated that the statute in this 
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regard is intended to protect states and relates to pro-
ceedings wherein the decision sought hy the party so 
testifying would tend to reduce or irnpair the estate and 
does not relate to the relative rights of the heirs or 
devisees as to the distribution of an estate in a pro-
ceeding by which the estate itself is not in either event 
to be reduced or impaired. 
Points 3 and 4. Under the rulings of the lower 
Court, it should be apparent that the Court entirely rnis-
construed the meaning of the "dead man's statute." 
Rule 43 (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make the 
right of cross examination of a witness as broad as pos-
sible and in part states as follows: 
''A party may call an adverse party'' etc. 
It is interesting to note at this point that the words 
''adverse party'' are exactly the same in the ''dead 
man's statute" as contained in the rules which goes 
on to say that "Such witnesses thus called may be con-
tradicited and impeached by, or on behalf, of the adverse 
party." The word "adverse party" is used in its ord-
inary means, according to Webster's Collegiate Diction-
ary, ''acting against, opposed, opposite.'' 
Certainly the adverse party in this case as far as 
the plaintiffs are concerned, are the defendants and the 
adverse parties so far as the defendants are concerned, 
are the plaintiffs. 
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The objedion presented by counsel for the defend-
ant~ ( tr. 105) is enlightening where Th1r. Young objects 
upon the grounds that they are defending the validity 
of the 1~)-!9 deeds, and therefore, contend to be defend-
ing as grantees. but as to the 1943 deeds, he seems to con-
tend that they are heirs. The Court seemed to take Mr. 
Young's view of the matter because at page 107 the 
Court said: 
"If (the objection) is raised as an heir, it 
should be sustained. And a logical following 
through under Mr. Young's theory of the case 
as stated in the record, I should, as to the 1943 
deeds, sustain the objection." 
This ruling was sustained throughout the case with-
out any thought given to the fact that the defendants 
were called by the plaintiff, the plaintiff being the ad-
verse party to the witness called. The calling of these 
witnesses by plaintiffs and appellants certainly waived 
the statute, but as I recall, the oral arguments before the 
Court, :Mr. Young claimed that he was entitled to defend 
against the 1943 deeds as heirs, and therefore the statute 
applied, and to uphold the 1949 deeds as grantees, and 
therefore the statute did not apply ( tr. 105) 
An Annotation carried in 159 ALR 416 follows two 
other earlier Annotations cited therein, and which states 
the rule to be : 
''The general rule stated in the earlier An-
notations that subject certain qualifications, the 
cross e:xamination of a witness concerning trans-
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actions or conversations with a deceased party, 
amounts to a waiver of the incompetency of the 
witnesses with respect to such matters and ren-
ders him incompetent to testify thereto as against 
the examining party.'' 
It should not be necessary to cite further authorities, 
but I want to earnestly state to the Court that I have 
searched diligently for authorities holding to the con-
trary, and have found none, and I hope that counsel for 
the adverse party will correct me if there are such 
opposite cases. 
The only possible reason that counsel would object 
to his clients testifying would be to prevent their test-
imony concerning the 1943 deeds. Let us assume that 
they would tell the truth concerning the transactions 
with the deceased. If the truth was that the deeds 
were never delivered, then the testimony certainly would 
not have been damaging to him. This Court has said 
many times that the purpose of the statute was to pre-
vent the tendency of witnesses to favor their own theory 
of the case. The purpose of the statute is certainly ;not 
to prevent the Court and Jury from hearing the truth. 
If the manner of handling the two sets of deeds by the 
deceased Anderson was the san1e in 1943 as it was in 
1949, then all parties to this case must admit that the 
1943 deeds were valid. This is so because Marie testi-
fied ( tr. 322) that all of the deeds of '43 were held in 
the saine place and she further testified that Ren told 
her to file the 1943 deeds and she asked someone else 
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about filing then1 and they told her not to, but she did-
not reineinber who that wat', and that ''as long as Dad 
wa~ aliYe ( tr. 3:23) not to file then1." She apparently 
believed therefore, that t'he had a right to file the '43 
deeds t'O that it appeart' that the '43 deeds were de-
livered but not filed. 
K ow in the case of the 1949 deeds, so far as the 
appellants were concerned, these deeds were still held; 
these were not physically delivered to the appellants 
but respondents claim that these deeds are valid. 
If, therefore, both deeds were treated in the same 
manner by the deceased, then the first deeds, in point 
of time, are valid and respondents were both persons 
who had this knowledge and should have been per-
mitted to testify to both transactions. 
The continual objections and the sustaining of these 
objections had such an effect upon Marie's testimony 
( tr. 215) that she seemed to believe that the trans-
actions of '43 were similar because once when Ren was 
there on a visit, she got the '43 deeds and showed then1 
to Ren. She testified that she thought that they were 
gotten from their Dad's desk. She was asked if she 
then thought that her Father had fixed up his property 
by execution of the 1943 deeds and she said she could not 
remember. She was asked if she thought her Father 
had fixed up the property and she answered, "I'm try-
ing to figure out-well, I don't know how to answer 
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without implicating Dad in it.'' 
Her further answer on page 215 is indeed revealing 
where she answered as follows: 
''Well, Dad, all his life had 1nade deeds. As I 
stated yesterday, he made deeds continously and each 
deed was supposed to be ''the'' deed-what should I 
say~ I don't know how to word it." 
It should be plain that had Marie been permitted to 
testify to the transactions with the deceased, that some 
revealing testimony would have gone to the jury. But 
of course her testimony was excluded under the pro-
vision of the ''dead man's statute.'' 
The rule applicable is well stated 1n 58 Am. Jur. 
210: 
"The law recognizes that it may sometimes 
be to the advantage of the person for whose ben-
efit the statute prohibiting a witness from test-
ifying concerning transactions or statements of 
deceased persons, and conductive to the ends of 
justice, to permit the disqualified witness to test-
ify; and to this end a person for whose benefit 
the statute exists may exercise discretion in mak-
ing an incompetent witness competent.'' 
Again at page 212 : ''The general rule is, 
subject to certain qualifications, that the cross-
examination of a witness concerning transactions 
or conversations with a deceased party, concern-
ing which the witness did not testify to on the 
direct examination, amounts to a waiver of the 
incompetency of the witness with respect to such 
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rnatters, and renders him incompetent to testify 
as against the examining party." 
It should be obvious that as appellants, they are the 
protected and adYerse parties, and can waive the in-
eompetency; and appellant only can waive; that as to 
re~pondents they are the protected parties against in-
cmnpetent witnesses of the adverse parties in the suit, 
and only they can waive. 
~Iarie was permitted to testify that in 1949 (tr. 
125) her dad n1ade a deed to respondents, and was by 
him instructed to destroy the 1943 deeds (Tr. 126). She 
kept here deed, and recorded it the day before her 
Father died, but never did deliver Ren's 1949 deed to 
him, and it was never tendered until during the Court 
proceedings (Tr. 126). 
Equally frank testimony concerning transactions in-
volving the 1943 deeds would have undoubtedly changed 
the outcome of the case. The Court ruled (Tr. 206) 
1\{arie testifying: ''I'm going to sustain your objection 
(respondent's) insofar as any alleged statement of the 
deceased is concerned. I just want the witness to under-
stand it . . . the witness is directed not to give us any 
statements of her father concerning any 1943 transaction 
or to relate any transactions with her father, but out-
side of that go ahead.'' This ruling was apparently 
on the erroneous theory of opposing counsel as follows : 
(Tr. 118) "If they're (referring to Marie Johnson) 
called on behalf of the party who is defendant, the party 
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defending may waive the statute, but not the party 
who is seeking to establish the evidencc3 • That's my 
understanding of the statute.'' 
There can be no douht but that, aside frmn keeping 
evidence of the 1943 transactions from the jury, the 
rulings of the Court had an influence on the jury be-
cause of the instruction of the Court to the jury: ( Tr. 
119) ''So the jury will understand what we're doing, 
at this tixne, unless the court changes its mind the objec-
tions are sustained as to the 1943 deeds, and the theory 
being, gentlemen, that any transactions had with the 
deceased Lorenzo Anderson cannot be testified to by any 
of these people here. As to the 1949 deed, there may 
be a different ruling as we go along.'' Such an instruc-
tion cannot help but influence the deliberations of a 
jury for a lapnan would naturally feel that by judicial 
ruling the 1943 deeds were a nullit:v, and this would 
leave them nothing to do by find that the 1949 deed::; 
were delivered. And that is exactly happened. 
I find one positive statement that a grantee is not 
protected by the statute: 
''A grantee is not protected under a statute 
protecting executors, administrators, heirs, leg-
atees, or devisees of any deceased person, where 
the GRANTEE IS DEFENDING AS SUCH, 
AND NOT AS HEIR OR DEVISEE". (Caps 
mine) 58 Am. Jur. 201". (Note: the Annotation 
cited in support of this must contain a mis-print, 
for 122 ALR 255 is on another subject. However, 
I do find an Annotation in 66 ALR 1041 where 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lD 
the eases are split as to whether a grantee or 
assignee or decedent can be construed as a re-
presentative of decendent. But, all of the cases 
cited are old and only deal with statutes using 
the word "representative and decedent". Our 
statute specifically omits any mention of a repre-
sentative of decedent. 
To recapitulate all points: ( 1) All parties are 
grantees of deceased and as such a r e therefore 
competent witnesses; (2) defendants and -respondents 
are not defending as heirs, but as grantees, and 
are competent witnesses; (3) defendants and respondents 
were called to testify by the adverse party and if other-
wise incmnpetent, the objection was waived by plaintiffs 
and appellants; ( 4) the exclusion of the testimony of 
each of the parties as to transactions with deceased 
was prejudicial error, and each exclusion sufficient to· 
grant a new trial; ( 5) the repeated rulings of the Court 
as to the exclusion of evidence relating to the 1943 deeds 
was misleading to the jury and prejudiced their deliber-
ations against appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRESTON & HARRIS 
Attorneys for appellants 
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